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With credit spreads contributing under 15% of investment-grade yield, Goldman Sachs argues corporate bonds increasingly trade as a rates product — a shift that changes what buyers are actually being paid for.
Elevated U.S. Treasury yields have made corporate credit attractive even at historically tight spreads, because the risk-free component now supplies the bulk of the return, Goldman Sachs said. In U.S. investment-grade credit, spreads account for less than 15% of total yield, down from roughly 45% on average between 2019 and 2021. In high yield, spreads contribute about 37% of all-in yield, versus roughly 75% previously.
The mechanism Goldman describes is arithmetic rather than a change in credit quality. A bond's all-in yield is the sum of the risk-free rate and the spread paid for credit risk. When sovereign yields rise sharply, the risk-free term grows while the spread term stays compressed, so the same total yield is composed differently. That is why tight spreads have not deterred buyers: the all-in yield, not the spread, is what many institutions are mandated to hit.
The buyers most exposed to that logic are pensions, insurers and foreign investors, according to Goldman. For these groups, an all-in yield target can be met even when the compensation for default risk is thin, because the government-bond component does the heavy lifting. The same pattern is more pronounced in Europe, where sovereign yields have climbed sharply from the negative-rate environment of several years ago, leaving even less of the total return attributable to credit risk.
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The practical consequence is that a larger share of corporate bond performance now tracks the direction of government yields rather than the creditworthiness of issuers. Goldman's figures put the spread contribution below 15% of investment-grade yield and around 37% in high yield, against roughly 45% and about 75% respectively in 2019-2021. In that environment, a portfolio of corporate credit behaves more like a quasi-rates product: duration and rate expectations matter more, and the credit spread offers less cushion if default risk rises.